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Abstract
An ever-important issue is protecting infrastructure and other valuable targets from a range
of threats from vandalism to theft to piracy to terrorism. The “defender” can rarely afford
the needed resources for a 100% protection. Thus, the key question is, how to provide the best
protection using the limited available resources.
We study a practically important class of security games that is played out in space and time,
with targets and “patrols” moving on a real line. A central open question here is whether the
Nash equilibrium (i.e., the minimax strategy of the defender) can be computed in polynomial
time. We resolve this question in the affirmative. Our algorithm runs in time polynomial in the
input size, and only polylogarithmic in the number of possible patrol locations (M). Further,
we provide a continuous extension in which patrol locations can take arbitrary real values. Prior
work obtained polynomial-time algorithms only under a substantial assumption, e.g., a constant
number of rounds. Further, all these algorithms have running times polynomial in M , which
can be very large.
1 Introduction
Protecting infrastructure and other valuable targets from a range of threats from vandalism to
theft to piracy to terrorism is an ever-important issue around the world, aggravated recently by
increased threats of piracy and terrorism. Providing 100% protection usually requires more money
or other resources than the “defender” can commit. Thus, the key question is, how to provide the
best protection using the limited resources that are available.
A successful recent approach casts this issue in game-theoretic terms, modeling it as a security
game: a zero-sum game between the defender who has some targets to protect, and the attacker
who strives to inflict damage on these targets. Usually the defender needs to commit to a particular
allocation of resources, such as the schedule of patrols, whereas the attacker can strike at will; this
corresponds to a classic game-theoretic model called a Stackelberg game. The defender can (and
should) randomize, e.g. so as to prevent the attacker from exploiting a particular gap in the patrol
schedule. The attacker can be strategic and optimize his attack according to his beliefs about the
defender’s strategy. The literature has mostly adopted a pessimistic view, in which the attack is
the exact best response to the defender’s actual strategy. Thus, the defender’s goal is to use an
optimal (minimax) strategy.
This approach has resulted in a flurry of research activity, including several awards and nomi-
nations. Further, it has been adopted in a number of real-world deployments, ranging from patrol
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boats to airport checkpoints to US air marshals to an urban transit system to wildlife protec-
tion. (Many of them have been recognized with commendations and awards.) Other potential
applications include protecting aid convoys in unstable regions, and protecting ships from piracy.
Most applications of security games are spatio-temporal in the sense that the patrols move from
one location to another with a limited speed, and only protect targets that are sufficiently close.
Then the defender’s strategy is a rather complicated object: a pure strategy should specify a tra-
jectory for every patrol, possibly choosing from a very large number of possible locations. Further,
in many applications targets have their own trajectories that need to be taken into consideration.
The first-order question in spatio-temporal security games is computing the equilibrium, i.e., the
minimax strategy for the defender. More specifically, we focus on exact equilibrium computation
in polynomial time. The prior work (e.g., [8, 5, 20]), as well as the present paper, considers a
one-dimensional space (that is, patrol and target locations are on the real line), and discretizes it
uniformly into the possible patrol locations. The relevant parameters are: the number of patrols
(K), the number of targets (A), the number of rounds of scheduling (T ), and the number of possible
patrol locations (M). The input specifies trajectories of targets and their values; the trajectories
may be arbitrary, and the values may change over time. Thus, the input size is O(T ·A+log(K ·M)).
What makes the problem particularly challenging is that the number of pure strategies — tuples
of patrol trajectories — is as large as (M)KT .
A central open question here is whether the Nash equilibrium (i.e., the minimax strategy of
the defender) can be computed in polynomial time. We resolve this question in the affirmative:
our main result is an algorithm that computes the exact equilibrium in time polynomial in the
input size. In particular, the running time scales only polylogarithmically in the number of possible
patrol locations. Moreover, we provide a continuous extension in which patrol locations can take
arbitrary real values, under a mild technical assumption that the target locations are rational. The
dependence on the number of patrols is argued away: while a pure strategy of the defender must
specify a trajectory for each patrol, we prove that poly(TA) patrols suffices to protect all targets.
The output is a distribution over poly(TA)-many pure strategies.
We improve over the state-of-art prior work [8, 20] in several ways. First, the running time in [8]
is exponential in the number of patrols (K) and becomes impractical even for K = 3 [20]. Second,
[20] achieves a polynomial running time only under a substantial assumption: either a constant
number of rounds, or that all targets have a unit value at all times, or that the “protection ranges”
of the patrols are so small that they cannot overlap for any two adjacent patrol locations. Third, the
running times in [8, 20] depend polynomially on the the number of patrol locations (M). Finally,
the polynomial running time in [20] relies on the Ellipsoid Algorithm for solving linear programs,
which is notoriously slow in practice.
Our techniques. Our main algorithm works on the discretized version of the problem, in which the
possible locations for patrols are integers from 1 to M (there is no such restriction on the location
of targets). The algorithm consists of three parts: partitioning the spatial domain, formulating
patrol placements in a single time point, and combining them to find the optimal strategy for all
time points. Below we describe these three parts one by one.
First, we partition the spatial domain into a relatively small number of intervals so that the
patrol locations inside each interval are “equivalent” to one another as far as our problem is con-
cerned. Then we use these intervals as “atomic” patrol locations, thereby replacing the dependence
on M with the dependence on the number of intervals. The partitioning algorithm starts from the
last round T and goes backwards in time: for each round t it constructs a collection of intervals
based on the target locations at time t and the intervals constructed for time t+ 1, so as to ensure
the desired “equivalence” property. We bound the number of intervals by O(T 3A).
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Second, for each time point t we construct a graph Gt which models any possible snapshot of the
patrol placements at this time. More specifically, every patrol placement at time t can be mapped
to a specific path in Gt, and every randomized patrol placement can be mapped to a specific unit
flow in Gt. Furthermore, we define the cost of a path/flow in Gt such that it equals the maximum
utility of the attacker under the corresponding (randomized) patrol placement at time t, and can
be computed via a linear program.
Third, we create a linear program that “unifies” the graphs Gt, and use this LP to construct
the minimax strategy for the defender. The LP ensures that the (randomized) patrol placements
computed in each Gt are consistent with one another, in the sense that there is a valid transition
from one round to the next, without violating the speed restriction. To accomplish this, the LP finds
min-cost flows in each Gt, and includes additional linear constraints that guarantee consistency.
We post-process the solution of this LP and remove the crossing edges in the flows. Finally, we
incrementally construct a mixed strategy of the defender based on the post-processed solution and
prove that it is indeed the optimal strategy.
In the continuous version of the problem, patrol locations can take arbitrary real values, and
the target locations are rational. We first re-scale all target locations to integers, and prove that
this re-scaled problem instance admits a discrete solution. Then we use the algorithm from the
discretized version. It is essential that the running time of the latter is polylogarithmic in M .
Related work. Security games have been studied extensively in the past decade, see the book
[18] as well as more recent work, e.g. [8, 5, 12, 20, 19]. The research concerned both theoretical
foundations as well as applications. Publicized real-world deployments include: US Coast Guard
patrol boats [8], canine-patrol and vehicle-checkpoints scheduling in Los Angeles airport (LAX)
[16], scheduling flights for air marshals by US Federal Air Marshal Service [10], airport passenger
screening by US Transportation Security Administration [6], fare inspection in Los Angeles transit
system [21], and wildlife protection in Malaysia [9].
Most relevant to the present work are papers on computing minimax strategy in zero-sum
spatio-temporal security games. While the initial work assumed static targets [18], some of the
later work addressed moving targets [5, 8, 20] (as discussed above). On a related note, if the
patrols are allowed to accelerate, with an upper bound on the acceleration, then computing the
defender’s minimax strategy becomes NP-hard [20, 19]. Other work concerned solving security
games that are not (necessarily) spatio-temporal or zero-sum, e.g. [7, 11, 20] A notable line of work
in security games assumes that the defender does not fully know attackers’ values for the targets,
but can learn more about them over multiple rounds of interaction with the said attackers (see [15]
for a recent survey of a subset of this work, as well as [13, 14, 4, 2]).
In a broader game-theoretic context, our work is related to Stackelberg games and equilib-
rium computation. Originally introduced to model competing firms, Stackelberg games is a classic
concept in game theory which appears in many textbooks and countless papers.
Computing Nash Equilibria is a central problem in algorithmic economics. While this problem
is known to be PPAD-hard in general, polynomial-time algorithms exist for many natural classes of
games, particularly for zero-sum games (for background, see a survey [17] and references therein).
Yet, these algorithmic results are insufficient for games in which the number of pure strategies can
be exponential in the input size (see [1, 3] for examples of such games).
Further directions. Many ideas in this paper may be useful for solving other spatio-temporal
security games. In particular, the overall algorithmic framework of locally solving each “time layer”
under some compatibility constraints and then merging the “time layers” to compute the global
optimum solution appears broadly applicable.
We believe our techniques can be extended to achieve a polynomial time algorithm for several
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Figure 1: An illustration of how targets and patrols move in discrete (a) and continuous (b) models
of the problem.
extensions of the model. In particular, we can incorporate additional constraints on the patrols,
such as obstacles that the patrols cannot cross over, or speed limits that depend on a particular
location. We can also handle scenarios when the spatial domain or the timeline are not evenly
discretized. (For ease of presentaton, we do not include these extensions in the present paper).
A general way to model such extensions is to assume that the range of valid movements for each
location is given in the input. Whenever we still have a property that the patrols do not need to
cross each other in an optimal solution (which indeed is a very natural property for homogeneous
patrols), our techniques achieve a polynomial-time algorithm in the input size. However, the input
size for this extended model gets large, and no longer scales polylogarithmically in M .
That said, some important special cases allow for succinct input. For example, a small number of
obstacles can be specified directly, rather than given implicitly via the ranges of valid movements.
Designing a polynomial-time algorithm for such cases requires a problem-specific pre-processing
step for partitioning the locations (which could potentially be very different from the partitioning
step in this paper). However, the rest of the algorithm could be essentially the same.
It is very tempting to extend our model to a two-dimensional space. We believe some of our
techniques can be useful for this extension, most importantly the compatibility constraint technique
from Section 3.3. The main challenge in extending our approach is an appropriate generalization
of the “day graphs”.
2 Preliminaries
Our goal is to find an optimal patrol scheduling strategy for the defender to protect a set of A
mobile targets in a one-dimensional space. Figure 1 illustrates the problem in a 2-D diagram; the
x-axis denotes the evenly discretized temporal domain containing T + 1 time points, and the y-axis
denotes the one-dimensional space of length M . We say a spatial position i is above j, if i > j and
similarly define a spatial position i to be under j, if i < j.
The defender has K homogeneous patrols to protect a set of moving targets from a potential
attack. Patrols have a maximum speed of ∆. This means, a move from a position mt at time t to
mt+1 at time t+1 is invalid if |mt+1−mt| > ∆. We consider two models of the problem: discretized
model, denoted by DSG (Figure 1-a), and continuous model, denoted by CSG (Figure 1-b). In the
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discretized model, the position of any patrol at any time point is an integer between 0 and M , but in
the continuous model, the patrol locations are not restricted to be integers (note that the temporal
domain is still discretized). Furthermore, for any target a, ha,t and wa,t respectively denote its
position and weight at time t. Note that in both models, there is no restriction on the position and
the speed of targets and the weight of the targets could change from time to time (e.g., ferries may
not carry the same number of people at different times). The patrols protect any target within
their protection radius R (a fixed number for all patrols). That is, a patrol k at position mt at
time t, protects a target a, if |ha,t −mt| ≤ R. In Figure 1, the grey ranges around patrols denote
the area they protect. We denote the set of targets, the set of spatial positions, the set of patrols
and the set of all time points by [A], [M ], [K] and [T ] respectively.
A patrol path, is a sequence of T positions (m1,m2, . . . ,mT ), such that for any t ∈ [T ], a move
from mt to mt+1 does not violate the speed limit (the black paths in Figure 1 denote patrol paths).
A pure strategy of the defender is a set of K patrol paths denoted by {vk}k∈[K]. A mixed strategy of
the defender, is a probability distribution over her pure strategies. A pure strategy of the attacker
is a single target-time pair (a, t) which means the attacker attacks target a at time t. Let {vk}k∈[K]
be the pure strategy of the defender and (a, t) be the pure strategy of the attacker, attacker’s utility
is 0 if target a is protected by at least one patrol at time t and it is wa,t if it is not protected by
any patrols. We assume the game is zero-sum and find minmax strategies.
Without loss of generality, we can assume K ≤ TA. This observation comes from the fact
that with only TA patrols, the defender can provide a 100% protection without needing any more
patrols. To do this, for any target-time pair (a, t), the defender can put a still patrol at the location
of target a at time t.
3 Discrete Model
The main goal of this section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1 There is a polynomial time (in input size) algorithm to solve DSG.
3.1 Partitioning The Positions
The number of pure strategies in a single time point, even with only one patrol, is not polynomial
in the input size, since the number of possible locations, M , could be exponentially larger than the
input size. To overcome this difficulty, we partition the spatial positions into polynomially many
sets of consecutive positions which we call intervals and we only keep track of these intervals instead
of maintaining the exact position of a patrol within the intervals. For example, assume there is
only one target, one patrol and T = 1, then it only matters whether the patrol’s protection range
contains the location of the target or not and the exact position of the patrol does not matter.
We use Algorithm 1 to partition the positions into meaningful intervals. For any given time
point t, the function GetIntervalPoints, generates a sorted array Pt = 〈p1, . . . , pnt〉 of numbers
that we call interval points and GetIntervals uses these generated interval points to partition
the spatial positions of any time point t to intervals:
It = 〈[p1, p2), [p2, p3), . . . , [pnt−1, pnt)〉.
The intervals are assumed to be left-closed and right-open to simplify the calculations. We use
It[i] to denote the i-th interval in It and use It[i : j] to denote the set of consecutive intervals
{It[i], It[i+ 1], . . . , It[j]}.
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Algorithm 1 Partitions the given positions into intervals
1: function GetIntervals
2: for t = T to 1 do
3: if t < T then Pt ←GetIntervalPoints(t, Pt+1)
4: else Pt ←GetIntervalPoints(t, ∅)
5: It ← Array()
6: for any two consecutive items pi and pi+1 in Pt do
7: It .Insert([pi, pi+1))
8: return 〈I1, . . . , IT 〉
9: function GetIntervalPoints(t, Pt+1)
10: Pt ← SortedArray()
11: Pt.Insert(0), Pt.Insert(M)
12: ← a sufficiently small number in R+
13: for each target a ∈ [At] do
14: if ha,t −R > 0 then Pt.Insert(ha,t −R)
15: if ha,t +R < M then Pt.Insert(ha,t +R+ )
16: for p in Pt+1 do
17: if p−∆ > 0 then Pt.Insert(p−∆)
18: if p+ ∆ < M then Pt.Insert(p+ ∆)
19: for any item pi in Pt do
20: if interval [pi, pi+1) does not contain any patrol position then
21: Pt.Remove(pi)
22: return Pt
The following lemma proves the total number of intervals is polynomial in the input size and
as a corollary of that, Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time in the input size.
Lemma 3.2 The total number of intervals created by Algorithm 1 is O(T 3A).
Proof. To prove this, we charge any interval point to a target/time pair and show no target/time
pair will be charged more than O(T 2) times and since there are at most O(AT ) target/time pairs,
there will not be more than O(T 3A) interval points. Note that there are two ways for interval
points to be added to a partitioning set Pt (Figure 2):
1. For any target a at time point t, two interval points ha,t − R and ha,t + R +  are added to
Pt. We charge these two interval points to (a, t).
2. For any interval point p in Pt+1 two interval points p − ∆ and p + ∆ are added to Pt. We
recursively charge these two intervals to the target/time pair that the interval point p is
charged to.
This means an interval point p could be charged to a target/time pair (a, t), only if ha,t = p± i∆ +
R+  or ha,t = p± i∆−R for any integer i where i ≤ t. Although this condition is only necessary
and not sufficient, but it implies at most O(T 2) interval positions could be charged to an arbitrary
target/time pair and therefore the total number of partition points is O(T 3A). 
Note that since by Lemma 3.2, the total number of interval points at any time point t is
polynomial in the input size, function GetIntervalPoints(t, Pt+1), which is simply a loop over
Pt+1 and the targets, runs in polynomial time.
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Corollary 3.3 Algorithm 1 halts in polynomial time in the input size.
The following lemmas prove two important properties of the partitions generated by Algo-
rithm 1. These properties basically imply all patrol locations within the same interval are equivalent
as far as the problem is concerned.
Lemma 3.4 Let k and k′ be two patrols in the same interval at any time t. The set of targets that
k and k′ protect at time t are equal.
Lemma 3.5 Let [si, fi) and [sj , fj) be two arbitrary intervals in It and It+1 respectively. If there
exists a feasible move from an arbitrary position in [si, fi) to a position in [sj , fj), for any position
in [si, fi), there exists a feasible move to a position in [sj , fj).
We can now define the feasible set of a set of consecutive intervals:
Definition 3.6 (feasible sets) We define the feasible set of It[i : j], denoted by feast(It[i : j]), to
be a subset of It+1, containing an interval It+1[i′] iff there exists a feasible move from a position in
some interval in It[i : j] to It+1[i′]. We may occasionally abuse this notation and use the simpler
form of feast(It[i]) instead of feast(It[i : i]) (Figure 3).
It is easy to see the following corollary of Definition 3.6:
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Corollary 3.7 For any It[i : j] there exists a consecutive interval set It+1[i′ : j′] such that
feast(It[i : j]) = It+1[i′ : j′].
Definition 3.8 (interval path) We define an interval path to be a sequence of T intervals 〈Ii[xi]〉T ,
such that for any time point t ∈ [T ], It+1[xt+1] ∈ feast(It[xt]). Moreover, for any interval path
ξ = 〈Ii[xi]〉T , we define S(ξ) to be the set of all patrol paths that are within ξ. More formally, a
patrol path 〈mi〉T is within S(ξ) if and only if for any time point t ∈ [T ], mt is in interval It[xt].
Note that any patrol path is within exactly one interval path, since intervals do not overlap
and they cover all locations. It could also be obtained from the following lemma that S(ξ) is never
empty for an interval path ξ. The proof is to choose any position in I1[x1] and following the valid
movements until we reach a position in IT [xT ].
Lemma 3.9 For any interval path ξ = 〈Ii[xi]〉T , there is at least one patrol path in S(ξ).
Note that by Lemma 3.4, two patrols that are in the same interval, protect the same set of targets
at that specific time. This implies that the patrol paths that are within the same interval path,
protect the same set of targets at all times and could be replaced with one another in any strategy,
without changing the utilities. This means the amount of information encoded in an interval path
is sufficient to describe the important characteristics of strategies and find the optimal one.
3.2 Strategies In a Single Time Point
In this section we explain how to locally find the best strategy for a single time point ignoring the
speed limitations. Note that although we proved the number of intervals is polynomial in the input
size, there are still exponentially many different ways to place our K patrols in them. This section
describes how we can resolve this problem and find the best strategy.
We use the term snapshot to denote a patrol placement at a single time point and formally
define it as follows:
Definition 3.10 (snapshots) A pure snapshot at time point t, is an assignment of patrols to
intervals of time t. We denote it by a sorted sequence of K intervals 〈It[yi]〉K such that for any
i ∈ [K], yi ≤ yi+1. A mixed snapshot, denoted by {(di, pi)}n is a probability distribution over n
pure snapshots where pi denotes the probability of choosing pure snapshot di and Σ
n
i=1pi = 1.
For any time point t, we construct a weighted directed graph Gt (called a day graph) and give a
one-to-one mapping between pure snapshots at time t and paths from St (source vertex) to S
′
t (sink
vertex), where St and S
′
t are two specific vertices of Gt. Moreover, we map any mixed snapshot at
time point t, to a network flow of 1 unit from St to S
′
t. This mapping is not necessarily one-to-one
and many mixed snapshots may be mapped to the same network flow; however, the maximum
utility of the attacker in all such mixed snapshots, will be the same.
In Definition 3.11 we formally explain how Gt is constructed. An informal explanation of it is
as follows: the vertex set of Gt, as shown in Figure 4-a, includes a vertex St, a vertex S
′
t and a
grid of K ×nt vertices (recall that nt is the number of intervals at time t) each denoted by Vt[x, y].
There is an edge from St to any vertex in the first column of the grid Vt[1, y], and there is an edge
from any vertex in the last column of the grid Vt[K, y] to S
′
t. Also for any x, y, and y
′, there is an
edge from Vt[x, y] to Vt[x+ 1, y
′] if y ≤ y′. Furthermore, we define a canonical path to be any path
from St to S
′
t and define a canonical flow to be any flow of unit 1 from St to S
′
t (Definition 3.12).
We give a one-to-one mapping between canonical paths in Gt and pure snapshots at time point t
8
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Figure 4: Figure (a) shows the vertices of a day graph and figure (b) shows a sample day graph.
The highlighted path in figure (b) shows a canonical path and its equivalent patrol placement is
shown in the vertical bar next to it, each grey piece denotes an intervals and the black dots denote
the location of patrols in them.
in Definition 3.13 and map any mixed snapshot to a canonical flow in Definition 3.14. Figure 4-b
shows a sample day graph, a canonical path in it and its equivalent pure snapshot. Moreover, we
assign weights to the edges of Gt such that the maximum payoff of the attacker for a pure (mixed)
snapshot equals the cost of its corresponding canonical path (flow). The cost of a canonical path
and a canonical flow is defined in Definition 3.12.
For any target a and any intervals i and i′ at time t, we define the binary value Ct(i, i′; a) to
be 1 if the following two conditions hold: (1) target a is located in a position between i and i′
(non-inclusive) at time t, and, (2) a could not be protected by any patrol at any arbitrary position
in i or i′; otherwise we set Ct(i, i′; a) to be 0. We similarly define two binary variables Ct(∅, i; a) and
Ct(i,∅; a) for the border cases. We set Ct(∅, i; a) to be 1 iff target a is in a position below i where
no patrol in i can protect it and set Ct(i,∅; a) to be 1 iff target a is in a position above i where no
patrol in i can protect it. Assume a patrol placement p does not protect a target a at time t. Let i
and i′ be the closest intervals to target a, that contain at least one patrol and are below and above
a respectively (set them to be ∅ if no such interval exits), then by definition Ct(i, i′; a) = 1. Using
this definition, we can now formally define a day graph and canonical path/flow.
Definition 3.11 (day graph) Given a time point t, we construct graph Gt as follows:
1. Graph Gt contains a vertex St (source), a vertex S
′
t (sink) and K × nt other vertices, each
denoted by Vt[x, y] for 1 ≤ x ≤ K and 1 ≤ y ≤ nt.
2. For any y such that 1 ≤ y ≤ nt, there is an edge from St to Vt[1, y]. If e denotes an edge of
this kind, for any target a, we define ce,a to be Ct(∅, It[y]; a).
3. For any y such that 1 ≤ y ≤ nt, there is an edge from Vt[K, y] to S′t. If e denotes an edge of
this kind, for any target a, we define ce,a to be Ct(It[y],∅; a).
4. For any two vertices Vt[x, y] and Vt[x + 1, y
′], if y ≤ y′, there is an edge from Vt[x, y] to
Vt[x+ 1, y
′]. If e denotes this edge, for any target a, we define ce,a = Ct(It[y], It[y′]; a).
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Definition 3.12 (canonical path/flow) In a day graph Gt any path from St to S
′
t is a canonical
path. Let E = {e1, e2, . . . , eK+1} be the set of edges in a canonical path, and a be an arbitrary
target. We define the cost of this canonical path for target a to be:∑
e∈E
ce,a.wt,a (1)
Also, any flow of unit 1 from St to S
′
t is a canonical flow. We denote any canonical flow with a
function f : E(Gt)→ [0, 1], where f(e) denotes the flow passing through an edge e. The cost of an
arbitrary canonical flow f , for day graph Gt is:
max
∑
e∈E(Gt)
f(e).ce,a.wt,a ∀a; where a ∈ [A.] (2)
Intuitively speaking, ce,a is 1 if and only if having edge e in a canonical path p implies that in the
“equivalent” pure snapshot of p, target a is not covered by any patrol. The formal mapping of
canonical paths and flows to snapshots is as follows.
Definition 3.13 (pure snapshot mapping) Let st = 〈It[yi]〉K be a pure snapshot (recall that
yi ≤ yi+1 for any i ∈ [K]). We map st to the following canonical path:
pt = 〈St, Vt[1, y1], Vt[2, y2], . . . , Vt[K, yK ], S′t〉
and similarly map pt to st and say st and pt are equivalent.
Definition 3.14 (mixed snapshot mapping) Let m = {(di, pi)}n be a mixed snapshot at time
t. Also let fi denote a flow of unit pi from St to S
′
t through the edges of the equivalent canonical
path of di. We construct flow f as follows: for any edge e of Gt, f(e) = Σ
n
i=1fi(e). Note that since
by definition of a mixed snapshot, Σni=1pi = 1, f is a flow of unit 1 from St to S
′
t, and hence is a
canonical flow. We map m to f .
In Lemma 3.15 we prove that the payoff of the attacker if he attacks target a at time t while the
placement of patrols is represented by the pure strategy s, equals to the cost of the target a in the
canonical path equivalent to s. Then in Lemma 3.16 we prove that the maximum payoff of the
attacker at time t while the strategy of defender is represented by the mixed snapshot m is equal
to the cost of canonical flow equivalent to m. These two lemmas can be directly obtained by the
given definitions, however, for space limitations, their formal proofs are left to the appendix.
Lemma 3.15 Let s be a pure snapshot at time t, and a be an arbitrary target. The payoff of the
attacker with respect to s, if he attacks the target a at time t, equals the cost of the target a in the
canonical path equivalent (Definition 3.13) to s.
Lemma 3.16 Let r be a mixed snapshot at time t and let f denote the canonical flow that r is
mapped to. The maximum expected payoff of the attacker at time t with respect to r, equals the cost
of f .
10
3.3 Best Strategy For All Time Points
Lemma 3.16 implies if our goal is to minimize the maximum payoff of the attacker at a single time
point t, it suffices to find a canonical flow in Gt with minimum cost. Although this works for the
special case when T = 1, but it does not consider the movement of patrols and their speed limits.
More precisely, a pure strategy for the defender could be shown as a sequence of pure snapshots
〈s1, s2, . . . , sT 〉. However there is one important condition: for any i ∈ [T ], there must be a feasible
transition from si to si+1. This is also the case for mixed snapshots and two consecutive ones may
not be necessarily compatible. In this section we resolve this issue and prove Theorem 3.1.
Our algorithm to find the optimal strategy of the defender consists of three main steps. In the
first step, which is explained in more details in Section 3.3.1, we run an LP that returns a canonical
flow for each day graph G1, . . . , GT . Apart from the constraints to ensure we get valid canonical
flows with minimum overall cost, our LP contains an extra constraint for compatibility of these
canonical flows. In the second step (Section 3.3.2), while keeping the overall characteristics of these
canonical flows unchanged, we adjust them in a way to make sure no two crossing edges in any of
the day graphs have a positive flow. Finally, in the third step (Section 3.3.3), we construct a mixed
strategy for the defender based on the adjusted canonical flows.
Let st and st+1 denote two pure snapshots representing the placement of patrols in a valid pure
strategy p at two consecutive times. In the following lemma we prove that there exists a feasible
move from i-th interval of st to the i-th interval of st+1 (recall that intervals in pure snapshots are
sorted based on their position). We prove this lemma by induction on the number of patrols. At
each step we prove that there exists a feasible move from the top most interval in st to the top most
interval in st+1 and we prove if we match these two together and remove them, we can construct
another pure strategy that contains the remaining intervals.
Lemma 3.17 If 〈It[yti ]〉K and 〈It+1[yti ]〉K are two pure snapshots at time t and t + 1 in at least
one valid pure strategy p, then for any j ∈ [K] we have It+1[yt+1j ] ∈ feast(It[ytj ]).
In the following definition, we define what it means for a patrol path to be intervally above,
below or equal to another patrol path:
Definition 3.18 Let v = 〈m0,m1, . . . ,mr〉 and v′ = 〈m′0,m′1, ...,m′T 〉 be two patrol paths. We say
v and v′ are intervally equal if for any t ∈ [T ], mt and m′t are in the same interval. We also define
v to be intervally under v′, if for any t ∈ [T ], either mt < m′t or mt and m′t are in the same interval.
Similarly, we define v to be intervally above v′, if v′ is intervally under v.
Next, in Lemma 3.19 we prove that there exists an optimal strategy of the defender that for any
pure strategy p in its support, there is an ordering of interval paths in p such that, i-th interval path
is always intervally under j-th interval path if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ K. To prove this we use Lemma 3.17
that indicates there exists a possible move from the k-th interval in pure snapshot s1 to the k-th
interval in pure snapshot s2 if s1 and s2 represent the patrols’ placement of a pure strategy in two
consecutive times and 1 ≤ k ≤ K. For any patrol k ∈ [K], we construct an interval path that
contains the k-th interval of all the pure snapshots in p, and we assign patrol k to this interval
path. It is easy to see that if we order the patrols from 1 to K the interval path assigned to patrol
k1 is under the interval path assigned to patrol k2 if 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ K. This lemma is very similar
to Lemma 3 of [20] but adopted to intervals paths.
Lemma 3.19 There exists an optimal mixed strategy of the defender, such that for every pure
strategy p in its support there is an ordering of interval paths 〈ξ1, . . . , ξK〉 such that the following
condition holds for this ordering: for any two interval paths ξi and ξj, in the pure strategy p, ξi is
intervally under ξj if i ≤ j.
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Again, for space limitations, the full proof is left to the appendix. However, intuitively, starting
from any given optimal solution one can swap the remaining path of any two patrols that cross
each other without losing anything. This eventually resolves all crosses and gives a desired optimal
solution.
Let s denote an optimal strategy of the defender that satisfies the condition mentioned in
Lemma 3.19, and let 〈ξp,1, ξp,2 . . . , ξp,K〉 denote the ordering of interval paths in pure strategy p in
support of s such that ξp,i is intervally under ξp,j if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K. Without loss of generality we
assume for any i ∈ [K] the same patrol is assigned to interval path ξp,i for all p in support of s, and
it is denoted by ki. Therefore, if 〈It[y1], It[y2], . . . , It[yK ]〉 denotes a pure snapshot that represents
the patrols’ placement in an arbitrary time point t ∈ [T ] in pure strategy p in support of s, It[yi] is
the position of patrol ki in pure strategy p at this time. Moreover, let m denote the mixed snapshot
of strategy s at time t. The flow passing through the vertex Vt[i, j], denotes the probability with
which patrol ki is placed in the j-th interval at time t. So, all the data related to position of patrol
ki at time t is in the column i of the day graph of time t. We use this later in the paper.
3.3.1 Linear Programming
In this section we explain how the first step of our algorithm, the LP, works.
Note that a flow of 1 unit in Gt with minimum weight, minimizes the attacker’s payoff at time t.
To minimize the attacker’s payoff at all time points, we need to minimize the cost of the canonical
flow with the maximum cost. To do this, for any edge e in any day graph Gt we define an LP
variable ft(e) which specifies the amount of flow passing through e. Moreover for any time point t,
we include the following constraints in our LP:
1. For each vertex v of Gt (except for the source vertex St and the sink vertex S
′
t) the amount
of ingoing flow to v is equal to the amount of outgoing flow from v.
2. The amount of outgoing flow from St is 1.
3. The amount of ingoing flow to S′t is 1.
4. The amount of flow passing through any edge e is not negative.
5. The cost of flow through any edge e and for any target a in Gt, specified by we,a × ft(e) is
not more than u.
And we set the objective function of our LP to minimize u, which is the overall cost of canonical
flows. However, as we said earlier the canonical flows we find must be compatible; therefore apart
from the aforementioned constraints, we define a compatibility constraint. Recall that feast(It[i : j])
denotes a collection of intervals at time t + 1 and contains an interval i′, iff there is a valid move
from an interval in It[i : j] to i′. We define a very similar concept for day graphs:
Definition 3.20 Let Vt[x; i : j] denote the set of consecutive grid vertices {Vt[x, i], Vt[x, i+1], . . . , Vt[x, j]}
in Gt. Recall that by definition of It[i : j], any vertices in Vt[x; i : j] is equivalent to an interval in
It[i : j]. We define feast(Vt[x; i : j]) as follows: feast(Vt[x; i : j]) is a subset of grid vertices of Gt+1
containing a vertex Vt+1[x, i
′] if and only if Vt+1[x, i′] is equivalent to an interval in feast(It[i : j]).
The compatibility constraint we use in our LP is as follows: for any set of consecutive vertices
Vt[x; i : j], the amount of flow passing through the vertices in Vt[x; i : j] is not more than the amount
of flow passing through the vertices in feast(Vt[x; i : j]). Intuitively, this constraint indicates that
for any set of consecutive intervals It[i : j], the probability that there exists a patrol in it, should
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min u (3)
f−t (v) = f
+
t (v) ∀t, v : t ∈ [T ], v ∈ V (Gt)− {St, S′t} (4)
f+t (St) = 1 ∀t : t ∈ [T ] (5)
f−t (S
′
t) = 1 ∀t : t ∈ [T ] (6)
f(e) ≥ 0 ∀e, t : t ∈ [T ], e ∈ Gt (7)∑
e∈E(Gt)
f(e).ce,a.wt,a ≤ u ∀t, a : t ∈ [T ], a ∈ [At] (8)∑
v∈Vt[k;i:j]
f+t (v) ≤
∑
v′∈feast(Vt[k;i:j])
f+t+1(v
′) ∀t, k, i, j : t ∈ [T ], k ∈ [K], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ nt (9)
Linear Program 1: Variable ft(e), which is defined for any edge e in the day graph Gt where t could
be any time point in [T ], denotes the amount of flow passing through e. By f−t (v) we mean the
total flow coming into vertex v (i.e., f−t (v) = Σft(e) where e is any edge ending at v). Also f
+
t (v)
denotes the total flow coming out of vertex v (i.e., f−t (v) = Σft(e) where e is any edge starting
from v).
not be more than the probability of having a patrol in its feasible set (feast(It[i : j])) in the next
time point. Note that by definition, feast(It[i : j]) contains all of the valid intervals that a patrol
in It[i : j] can move to; therefore it is obvious why this constraint is necessary. The sufficiency of
this constraint to prove compatibility of snapshots, however, comes later when we explain how we
construct an optimal strategy based on the adjusted LP solution. The formal definition of the LP
is given in Linear Program 1.
By the end of Section 3.3, we prove the solution of LP 1 is equal to the utility of the attacker
if both players play their optimal strategies. Lemma 3.21 proves a weaker claim:
Lemma 3.21 The solution of Linear Program 1 gives a lower bound for the utility of the attacker
when both players play their optimal strategies.
To prove Lemma 3.21, we start from an optimal strategy of the defender satisfying the condition
of Lemma 3.19 that the interval paths do not cross each other. Based on this strategy, we construct
a feasible solution for LP 1 in which the value of u is equal to the maximum possible utility of
the attacker. Note that this only proves LP 1 gives a lower bound for the utility of the attacker
when both players play their minimax strategies since the feasible solution we considered is not
necessarily the optimum solution of the LP (although as we said before, we will later prove that
they are exactly the same).
3.3.2 Adjusting The LP Solution
In this section we give an algorithm that adjusts any optimal solution of LP 1 to resolve their
“crossing flows”. We later use the adjusted solution to construct the defender’s optimal strategy.
We start by defining what we mean by crossing edges and crossing flows:
Definition 3.22 (crossing edges and crossing flow) Let e = (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x + 1, y2]) and e
′ =
(Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x+1, y
′
2]) be two arbitrary edges of day graph Gt where y1 < y
′
1. We say e and e
′ cross,
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Algorithm 2 Resolves crossing flows
1: function ResolveCrosses(f1, G1, f2, G2, . . . , fT , Gt)
2: for each timepoint t ∈ [T ] do
3: while ft contains any crossing flow do
4: {(Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+ 1, y2]), (Vt[x, y′1], Vt[x+ 1, y′2])} = FindNextCross(Gt, ft)
5: e← (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+ 1, y2])
6: e′ ← (Vt[x, y′1], Vt[x+ 1, y′2])
7: ResolveCross(e, e′)
8: function FindNextCross(Gt, ft)
9: (e, e′)← find the minimum crossing flow in ft
10: return (e, e′)
11: function ResolveCross(e, e′)
12: fm ← min(ft(e), ft(e′))
13: ft(e
′)← ft(e′)− fm
14: ft(e)← ft(e)− fm
15: (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+ 1, y2])← e
16: (Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x+ 1, y
′
2])← e′
17: ft((Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+ 1, y
′
2]))← fm
18: ft((Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x+ 1, y2]))← fm
if and only if y2 > y
′
2. Moreover, if f is a canonical flow of Gt, the crossing edge pair (e, e
′) is a
crossing flow in f , if f(e) > 0 and f(e′) > 0.
In the following definition, we give a total ordering on the crossing flows in a canonical flow,
which we later use in the algorithm we provide to resolve them.
Definition 3.23 (crossing flows’ ordering) Let (e1, e2) and (e3, e4) be two crossing flows of a
canonical flow. Also let e1 = (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+1, y
′
1]), e2 = (Vt[x, y2], Vt[x+1, y
′
2]), e3 = (Vt[x
′, y3], Vt[x′+
1, y′3]), and e4 = (Vt[x′, y4], Vt[x′+ 1, y′4]) be the vertices of these edges. We say (e1, e2) < (e3, e4) if
and only if one of the following conditions hold:
1. x < x′
2. x = x′ and y1 < y3.
3. x = x′ and y1 = y3 and y′1 < y′3.
4. x = x′ and y1 = y3 and y′1 = y′3 and y′2 < y′4.
5. x = x′ and y1 = y3 and y′1 = y′3 and y′2 = y′4 and y2 < y4.
Algorithm 2 is the formal pseudo-code of how we resolve all crossing flows. At each step, the
algorithm resolves the minimum crossing flow (minimum based on the total ordering defined in
Definition 3.23) and continues this process until there is no other one. Figure 5 illustrates how a
single crossing flow is resolved.
Lemma 3.24 Function ResolveCrosses of Algorithm 2 does not increase the total cost of the
input canonical flow.
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Figure 5: The whole idea of how to locally resolve the issue of having a crossing flow. The details
are formally explained in the text.
To prove Lemma 3.24, we consider all different locations of targets for which changing the flows
might affect the utility of players and prove in none of these cases the total cost is increased. The
complete proof is left to the appendix.
Lemma 3.25 The running time of the function ResolveCrosses in the Algorithm 2 is polyno-
mial.
The proof scheme of Lemma 3.25 is to show the minimum crossing flow at step i is strictly
less than the minimum crossing flow at step i + 1 (after the previously minimum crossing flow
is resolved). Consequently, since the total number of possible crossing edges of a day graph is
polynomial, the number of steps until the algorithm halts is polynomial. Again, we left the formal
proof of this lemma to the appendix for space limitations.
Note that another property of Algorithm 2 is that the flow passing through a vertex will not
change and it is only the amount of flow passing through the edges that changes (Figure 5). This
proves most of the constraints of LP 1 will still hold. The only two constraints that consider the
flow passing through the edges, and not the vertices, are number 7 and number 8. The former
will be true since the process does not produce any negative flow and the latter is true since by
Lemma 3.24 the total cost does not change.
Consequently, the following statement is true since we can first solve LP 1 by any polynomial
time LP-solver and the run Algorithm 2 on its solution.
Corollary 3.26 There exists a polynomial time algorithm that finds f〈f1, . . . , fT 〉, a collection of
canonical flows, that is a solution of LP 1, and for any t ∈ [T ] , ft does not contain any crossing
flow.
3.3.3 Constructing A Strategy
Assuming f is a non-crossing solution of LP 1, this section gives an algorithm to find a mixed
strategy of the defender that equivalent to the set of canonical flows in f and finally proves Theorem
3.1. We first define what we mean by the top most flow path of a non-crossing canonical flow:
Definition 3.27 (Top-Most Flow Path) Let ft be a canonical flow of Gt without any crossing
flows. We say a canonical path p = 〈e1, e2, . . . , eK+1〉 of Gt is a flow path of ft if for any k
(1 ≤ k ≤ K + 1), ft(ek) > 0. The top-most flow path of ft is the flow path of ft that is above all
other flow paths of ft (that is well-defined because ft does not have any crossing flow). The size of
the flow path p of ft, denoted by |p|, is m if for any k, ft(ek) ≥ m and there exists an edge ei of p
such that ft(ei) = m.
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Lemma 3.28 Let f = 〈f1, . . . , fT 〉 be a collection of non-crossing canonical flows that satisfies the
compatibility constraint (constraint number 9) of LP 1. For any t that {t, t+1} ⊂ [T ], the top-most
flow paths of ft and ft+1 are compatible.
Proof. Let 〈St, Vt[1, y1], . . . , Vt[K, yK ], S′t〉 and 〈St+1, Vt+1[1, y′1], . . . , Vt+1[K, y′K ], S′t+1〉 respectively
denote the top-most flow paths of ft and ft+1. It suffices to prove for any k ∈ [K], there is a valid
movement from the corresponding interval of Vt[k, yk] to the corresponding interval of Vt+1[k, y
′
k].
To do so, we assume this is not the case and obtain a contradiction. Let Vt+1[k, y
′
k] /∈ feast(Vt[k, yk])
for some k ∈ [K], then one of the following conditions should hold:
1. Vt+1[k, y
′
k] is below the feasible range feast(Vt[k, yk]).
2. Vt+1[k, y
′
k] is above the feasible range feast(Vt[k, yk]).
If the first condition is true, the contradiction is that Vt+1[k, y
′
k] cannot be in the top-most
flow path of ft+1. To see this, note that we know by constraint 9 of LP 1 that the total flow
passing through the vertices of feast(Vt[k, yk]) is not less than the flow passing through Vt[k, yk],
therefore there is a vertex in feast(Vt[k, yk]) (and above Vt+1[k, y
′
k]) with a non-negative flow and
thus Vt+1[k, y
′
k] cannot be in the top-most flow path of ft+1.
If the second condition is true, the contradiction is that constraint 9 cannot be satisfied. To see
this, note that since Vt[k, yk] is in the top-most flow path of ft, no flow passes through the vertices
above it and therefore
∑
v∈Vt[k;1:y] f
+
t (v) = 1. However, since Vt+1[k, y
′
k] is above the feasible range
feast(Vt[k, yk]),
∑
v′∈feast(Vt[k;1:y]) f
+
t+1(v
′) < 1 which means constraint 9 that indicates the value of
the latter summation should not be less than the former one, cannot be satisfied. 
Theorem 3.29 Let f = 〈f1, . . . , fT 〉 be a solution of LP 1 without any crossing flows. There exists
a polynomial time algorithm to find a mixed strategy of the defender that is equivalent to f .
To prove Theorem 3.29, we show the following iterative algorithm constructs the desired mixed
strategy in polynomial time:
1. Find the top-most flow paths p1, . . . , pT of f1, . . . , fT .
2. Construct the pure strategy p, corresponding to p1, . . . , pT .
3. Add p to s with probability q = min |pi|.
4. For any edge e of any pi, decrease fi(e) to fi(e)− q.
5. If there is any flow left in f1, . . . , fT , repeat all the steps.
Note that by Lemma 3.28, if the compatibility constraint of LP 1 is satisfied, the top-most flow
paths are compatible. Since at the first round of the algorithm, we have an actual solution of
the LP, the compatibility constraint is obviously satisfied. To completely prove the correctness
of this algorithm, we also need to show after each iteration, changing the flows does not violate
the compatibility constraint. For space limitations, we left this part of the proof to the appendix.
Furthermore, the running time of this algorithm is polynomial in the input size since in each
iteration, the flow passing through at least one edge decreases to zero and the total number of
edges is polynomial.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1: Recall that by Lemma 3.21, the optimal solution of LP 1 is a lower bound
for the utility of the attacker when both players play their optimal (minimax) strategies. Also note
that by Lemma 3.26 and Theorem 3.29, we can construct a mixed strategy s of the defender that
is equivalent to the optimal solution of LP 1 in polynomial time. This means the maximum utility
of the attacker when the defender plays s, is equal to its lower bound and therefore s minimizes
the maximum expected utility of the attacker: i.e., it is a minimax strategy of the defender. 
4 Continuous Model
In this section we prove the following theorem for the continuous model:
Theorem 4.1 There exists a polynomial time algorithm to find an optimal solution for CSG.
The given proof is based on a technical assumption that all numbers in the input are rational.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: The main idea of this proof is to reduce any instance of CSG to an
instance of DSG, for which we know there exists a polynomial time algorithm.
Recall that any rational number can be represented by a fraction ab such that both a and b are
integers. Let B be the set of denominators in this fractional representation of all numbers in the
input. We define m to be the product of all numbers in B. Note that the number of digits needed
to represent m is polynomial in the input size since every number in B appears in the input. To
create an instance of DSG, we multiply all target positions, ∆, R and M , given in the instance of
CSG to m.
To use the algorithm for DSG, it suffices to prove in the scaled solutions, there exists an optimal
solution that places patrols only in the integer locations. To do this, we prove that for any given
patrol path p1 = 〈mi〉T in the scaled version, there exists a patrol path p2 = 〈m′i〉T that covers the
same set of targets and for any t ∈ [T ], m′t is an integer position. It suffices to set m′t to be bmtc.
Note that since the position of all targets and the protecting ranges of the patrols in the scaled
version are all integers, this patrol path protects exactly the same set of targets. Now we can use
the algorithm of Theorem 3.1 to find the optimal solution of this scaled input and then scale it
back to the original size by dividing the patrols’ locations by m. 
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A Missing Proofs
Lemma 3.4
Statement. Let k and k′ be two patrols in the same interval at any time t. The set of targets that
k and k′ protect at time t are equal.
Proof. We suppose this is not the case and obtain a contradiction. Without losing generality
assume k protects a target a at time t that k′ does not. Lines 14 and 15 of Algorithm 1 indicate
there are two interval points pi and pj at ha,t−R and ha,t+R+ respectively. Assume  is too small
that there is no valid patrol position in the non-inclusive range between ha,t +R and ha,t +R+ .
This means a patrol has a distance of at most R from a (or simply protects a) if and only if it is
in an interval between pi and pj . Note that we assumed k
′ does not protect a, and hence it is not
between pi and pj , while k has to be between them to protect a. This means k and k
′ could not be
in the same interval, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.5
Statement. Let [si, fi) and [sj , fj) be two arbitrary intervals in It and It+1 respectively. If there
exists a feasible move from an arbitrary position in [si, fi) to a position in [sj , fj), for any position
in [si, fi), there exists a feasible move to a position in [sj , fj).
Proof. Suppose there exists a feasible move from a position xi in interval [si, fi) to a position xj
in interval [sj , fj). The existence of a feasible move from xi to [sj , fj) implies sj−∆ ≤ xi < fj +∆.
Also note that Line 17 and Line 18 of Algorithm 1 indicate fj + ∆ and sj −∆ are in Pt. Therefore,
since [si, fi) is the interval containing xi, the following equation holds:
sj −∆ ≤ si ≤ xi < fi ≤ fj + ∆
This means any possible location x′i in [si, fi) satisfies sj −∆ ≤ x′i < fj + ∆, and therefore has a
feasible move to [sj , fj). 
Lemma 3.9
Statement. For any interval path ξ = 〈Ii[xi]〉T , there is at least one patrol path in S(ξ).
Proof. By Definition 3.8, for any time point t ∈ [T ], there is at least one feasible move from a
position in It[xt] to a position in It+1[xt+1], also based on Lemma 3.5, existence of a feasible move
from interval It[xt] to interval It+1[xt+1] means there is a feasible move from any position in It[xt]
to at least one position in It+1[xt+1]. Therefore any patrol starting in any position in I1[x1], could
reach at least one position in IT [xT ] by feasible moves, which forms a patrol path in S(ξ). 
Lemma 3.15
Statement. Let s be a pure snapshot at time t, and a be an arbitrary target. The payoff of the
attacker with respect to s, if he attacks the target a at time t, equals the cost of the target a in
the canonical path equivalent (Definition 3.13) to s.
Proof. Let p = 〈St, Vt[1, y1], Vt[2, y2], . . . , Vt[K, yK ], S′t〉 be the canonical path equivalent to s and
E = {e1, e2, . . . , eK+1} be the set of edges in this canonical path. By Definition 3.13, s contains K
patrols in intervals It[y1], It[y2], . . . , It[yK ], which are already sorted based on position. Let [si, fi)
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denote the start and end positions of interval It[yi]. If target a is not covered by s exactly one of
the following conditions holds:
1. There exists a single i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1 and fi ≤ ht,a < si+1
2. ht,a < s1
3. fK ≤ ht,a
This indicates that if target a is not covered by s, there exists exactly one i such that 1 ≤ i ≤
K + 1 and cei,a = 1 (See Definition 3.12), but if it is covered cei,a = 0 for all the edges in this
path. By Definition 3.13, the cost of the target a in the canonical path equivalent to s is defined
as follows:
ΣK+1i=1 cei,a × wt,a
This formula equals to 0 if the target is covered, and it equals to wt,a otherwise, which is equal to
the payoff of the attacker with respect to s, if he attacks target a at time t.

Lemma 3.16
Statement. Let r be a mixed snapshot at time t and let f denote the canonical flow that r is
mapped to. The maximum expected payoff of the attacker at time t with respect to r, equals the
cost of f .
Proof. Let {(di, pi)}n denote the mixed snapshot r. Lemma 3.15 states that the payoff of the
attacker attacking target a while the pure snapshot di represents the placement of patrols at time
t is equal to:
Σe∈Eice,a × wt,a
where Ei denotes the set of edges in the canonical path equivalent to pure snapshot di. This
indicates that the expected payoff of the attacker attacking target a with respect to r is equal to:
Σni=1pi × (Σe∈Eice,a × wt,a) = Σe∈E(Gt)f(e)× ce,a × wt,a
So, the maximum expected payoff of the attacker while mixed snapshot r represents the placement
of patrols at time t equals to the cost of the canonical flow f that is defined in Definition 3.12 as
follows:
max Σe∈E(Gt)f(e)× ce,a × wt,a ∀a; where a ∈ [A.]

Lemma 3.17
Statement. If 〈It[yti ]〉K and 〈It+1[yt+1i ]〉K are two pure snapshots at time t and t + 1 in at least
one valid pure strategy p, then for any j ∈ [K] we have It+1[yt+1j ] ∈ feast(It[ytj ]).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on K.
Induction hypothesis: we assume this lemma holds for any K where K < n. For K = 1 , the
base case, each snapshot has one patrol and they have to be compatible.
Induction step: We show that if 〈It[yti ]〉n and 〈It+1[yt+1i ]〉n respectively denote a pure snapshot
at time t and t+ 1 in at least one pure strategy pn, It+1[yj ] ∈ feast(It[yj ]) for any j where j ≤ n.
Let 〈I1[z1], . . . , IT [zT ]〉 and 〈I1[w1], . . . , IT [wT ]〉 denote two interval paths in pure strategy pn such
that the following equations hold:
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1. It[zt] = It[ytn]
2. It+1[zt+1] = It+1[yt+1l ]
3. It[wt] = It[ytm]
4. Iz+1[wt+1] = It+1[yt+1n ]
We first prove that It+1[yt+1n ] ∈ feast(It[ytn]) and It+1[yt+1l ] ∈ feast(It[ytm]).
To prove It+1[yt+1n ] ∈ feast(It[ytn]) we first assume that this is not the case, then we obtain
a contradiction. Let sti and t
t
i respectively denote the start and end points of the interval It[yti ],
and let st+1i and t
t+1
i denote the starts and end points of the interval It+1[yt+1i ] for all i such that
1 ≤ i ≤ n. if It+1[yt+1n ] /∈ feast(It[ytn]) exactly one of the following conditions holds:
1. ttn +R ≤ st+1n : Since m ≤ n, in this case the inequality ttm +R ≤ ttn +R ≤ st+1n holds, which
indicates It+1[yt+1n ] /∈ feast(It[ytm]). This is a contradiction with the existence of the interval
path 〈I1[w1], . . . , It[ytm], It+1[yt+1n ], . . . , IT [wT ]〉 in the pure strategy pn.
2. tt+1n + R ≤ stn: Since l ≤ n, the inequality tt+1l + R ≤ tt+1n + R ≤ stn holds in this case. This
means It+1[yt+1l ] /∈ feast(It[ytn]), which is a contradiction with the existence of the interval
path 〈I1[z1], . . . , It[ytn], It+1[yt+1l ], . . . , IT [zT ]〉 in the pure strategy pn.
We proved It+1[yt+1n ] ∈ feast(It[ytn]). It is easy to see that It+1[yt+1l ] ∈ feast(It[ytm]) is also correct
in the same way.
Since It+1[yt+1m ] ∈ feast(It[ytl ]), 〈I1[w1], . . . , It[wt], It+1[zt+1], . . . , IT [zT ]〉 is a valid interval path.
Using this fact, we construct the pure strategy pn−1 by deleting interval paths 〈I1[z1], . . . , IT [zT ]〉
and 〈I1[w1], . . . , IT [wT ]〉 from pn, and adding the interval path 〈I1[w1], . . . , It[wt], It+1[zt+1], . . . ,
IT [zT ]〉 to it. One can easily see that 〈It[yti ]〉n−1 and 〈It+1[yt+1i ]〉n−1 respectively are the pure
snapshots at time t and t + 1, in pure strategy pn−1. Hence in this case K = n − 1, by induction
hypothesis, It+1[yt+1j ] ∈ feast(It[ytj ]) for any j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. We also proved that
It+1[yt+1n ] ∈ feast(It[ytn]). Therefore for any j where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, It+1[yt+1j ] ∈ feast(It[ytj ]), and the
proof of the induction step is complete.

Lemma 3.19
Statement. There exists an optimal mixed strategy of the defender, such that for every pure
strategy p in its support there is an ordering of interval paths 〈ξ1, . . . , ξK〉 such that the following
condition holds for this ordering: for any two interval paths ξi and ξj , in the pure strategy p, ξi is
intervally under ξj if i ≤ j.
Proof. We first prove that for any pure strategy p1 there exists a pure strategy p2 that protects the
same set of targets as p1, and there is an ordering of interval paths 〈ξ1, . . . , ξK〉 such that interval
paths ξi is intervally under ξj if i ≤ j ≤ K.
Let pure snapshot 〈It[yt1], It[yt2], . . . , It[ytK ]〉K denote the patrols’ placement in pure strategy
p1 at time t. We construct the pure strategy p2, such that even though it might have different
set of interval paths from p1, they share the same set of pure snapshots. Let Φ denote the set
of interval paths in p2. At first Φ = ∅. Then, for any patrol k ∈ [K] we add interval path
ξk = 〈I1[y1k], I2[y2k], . . . , IT [yTk ]〉 to Φ (The Interval path ξk contains the k-th interval of all the pure
snapshots of p1). Since in Lemma 3.17 we proved that It+1[yt+1k ] ∈ feast(It[ytk]), the set Φ consists
of K valid interval paths. Also for any ξi and ξj in Φ interval path ξi is intervally under the interval
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path ξj if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K. Since p1 and p2 share the same set of pure snapshots, they also protect
the same set of targets.
To prove this lemma, let m denote an optimal mixed strategy of the defender. We replace any
pure strategy in the support of m with its modified version So, the utility of defender playing this
mixed strategy does not change, and it is still an optimal strategy. Also, for any p in the support of
m if we order the interval paths from ξ1 to ξK , the following condition holds: for any two interval
path ξi and ξj , in the pure strategy p, ξi is intervally under ξj if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K 
Lemma 3.21
Statement. The solution of Linear Program 1 gives a lower bound for the utility of the attacker
when both players play their optimal strategies.
Proof. Based on Lemma 3.19, there exists an optimal mixed strategy s such that for any pure
strategy p in support of s this condition holds: there exists an ordered set 〈ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξK〉 of interval
paths in p such that for any i, j that 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ K, interval path ξi is intervally under ξj . Let uopt
denote the attacker’s utility in mixed strategy s, and let mixed snapshot mt denote the placement
of patrols at time t in mixed strategy s. Also fst denotes the corresponding canonical flow of mixed
snapshot mt. We set values of the variables in LP 1 as follows:
1. u = uopt
2. ft = f
s
t ∀t ∈ [T ]
Then, we prove that under this assignments all the constraints of the LP are satisfied. The set
of constraints in lines 3 to 7 of this LP are the necessary conditions for a canonical flow, so for any
t ∈ [T ], canonical flow fst satisfies them. There also exists another set of constraints in line 9, that
is necessary for the compatibility of two consecutive canonical flows. Let < ξp1 , ξ
p
2 , . . . , ξ
p
K > denote
interval paths in pure strategy p in support of s, such that ξpb is intervally under ξ
p
a for any a and b
that 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ K. Note that, if at time t patrol ka is in an interval in the set of intervals It[i : j]
such that 1 ≤ i ≤ nt and {t, t+ 1} ⊂ [T ], ka is in an interval in the set feast(It[i : j]) at time t+ 1.
This indicates that if at time t, with probability pa patrol ki is in an interval in the set It[i : j],
with probability at least pa at time t+ 1, ki is in an interval in the set feast(It[i : j]). In LP 1 , Gt
denotes the day graph corresponding to the mixed snapshot t in strategy s, and for any k ∈ [K],
the amount of flow crossing through the set of vertices Vt[k; i : j] in Gt denotes the probability that
at time t, patrol k is in It[i : j]. So the following equation holds:
Σv∈Vt[k;i:j]f
s+
t (v) ≤ Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:j])fs+t+1(v′)∀t, k, i, j : t, t+ 1 ∈ [T ], k ∈ [K], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ nt
In addition, the set of constraints in the line 8 of the LP is also satisfied since at least one of
them is violated only if the expected payoff of the attacker, attacking an arbitrary target a is more
than uopt, but uopt is the maximum payoff of the attacker while defender plays strategy s.
We proved that there exists a valid assignment to variables of this LP such that u = uopt, so
uopt is an upper bound for the value of u in this LP. 
Lemma 3.24
Statement. Function ResolveCrosses of Algorithm 2 does not increase the total cost of the
input canonical flow.
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Proof. As mentioned in Definition 3.12 the cost of a canonical flow is as follows:
max Σe∈E(Gt)f(e)× ce,a × wt,a ∀a; where a ∈ [At].
The only thing in this function that can affect the above mentioned cost is that the amount of
flow crossing through both edges e1 = (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x + 1, y2]) and e2 = (Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x + 1, y
′
2])
decreases by a particular amount, which is then added to the flow crossing through edges e3 =
(Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+1, y
′
2]) and e4 = (Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x+1, y2]). When the amount of flow passing through e1
and e2 decreases by fm the cost of choosing an arbitrary target a decreases by fm×wt,a(ce1,a+ce2,a),
and when this amount is added to flow of e3 and e4, the mentioned cost increases by fm×wt,a(ce3,a+
ce4,a). Since we want to show that the maximum cost for all the targets does not increase, it suffices
to prove that the amount of increment in cost for each target is less than the decrement. In other
words we prove the following relation holds for any arbitrary target:
(ce3,a + ce4,a) ≤ (ce1,a + ce2,a) (10)
Since e1 and e2 are crossing edges they have one of the conditiones mentioned in Definition 3.22.
Without loss of generality we assume the first condition holds, which means y1 < y
′
1 and y2 > y
′
2.
Moreover, by Definition 3.11, we have y1 ≤ y2 and y′1 ≤ y′2, which yields y1 < y′1 ≤ y′2 < y2.
Let e = (Vt[x, y], Vt[x + 1, y
′]) denote an arbitrary edge in Gt, where It[y] and It[y′] are intervals
corresponding to vertices Vt[x, y] and Vt[x+ 1, y
′]. Recall that by Definition 3.11 for any target a ,
ce,a is equal to 1 if the two following conditions hold: (1) target a is located in a position between
It[y] and It[y′] (non-inclusive) at time t, and, (2) target a could not be protected by any patrol at
any arbitrary position in It[y] or It[y′]; otherwise ce,a is equal to 0. (Here, we ignore those edges
that one of their connected vertices is S′t or St because these edges do not cross)
In the following, we prove that equation 10 holds for any possible value of (ce3,a+ ce4,a).
• ce3,a+ ce4,a= 0: Since the right side of the equation 10 is not less than 0 the inequality holds
in this case.
• ce3,a + ce4,a = 2: In this case, ce3,a = 1 and ce4,a = 1. So, target a is located in a position
between intervals It[y′1] and It[y2], and between intervals It[y1] and It[y′2]. Moreover, target a
can not be protected by any patrol that is either in interval It[y1], It[y′1], It[y2] or It[y′2]. This
indicates that ce1,a = 1 and ce2,a = 1 since ht,a, the position of target a at time t, is above
the intervals y1 and y
′
1 and below the intervals y
′
2 and y2 , which indicates that the target is
in a position between y1 and y2, and between y
′
1 and y
′
2. So, in this case ce1,a + ce2,a = 2, and
equality 10 holds.
• ce3,a + ce4,a = 1: In this case, ce3,a = 1 or ce4,a = 1. So, target a is located in a position
between intervals It[y′1] and It[y2] or it is in a position between intervals It[y1] and It[y′2].
This indicates that ce1,a = 1 since ht,a, the position of target a at time t, is above the interval
y1 and and below the interval y2. Moreover, one can easily see that having ce3,a = 1 or
ce4,a = 1 yields that target a can not be protected by any patrol that is either in interval
It[y1] or It[y2], so 1 ≤ ce1,a + ce2,a holds.
The three mentioned cases for the value of ce3,a+ ce4,a cover all possible cases, so equality 10
holds and this lemma is proved. 
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Lemma 3.25
Statement. The running time of the function ResolveCrosses in the Algorithm 2 is polynomial.
Proof. The main idea of this proof is that after each call of the function ResolveCross, the
minimum crossing flow gets greater. (two crossing flows are compared based on the comparison
defined in the Definition 3.23.) Since there are polynomially many pair of crossing edges the run
time of this algorithm is polynomial as well.
Two edges forming the minimum cross flow are e1 = (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x+1, y2]) and e2 = (Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x+
1, y′2]). Since e1 and e2 are crossing edges one of the conditions mentioned in Definition 3.22 holds
for them. Without loos of generality we assume the first condition holds, which means y1 < y
′
1
and y2 > y
′
2. By Definition 3.23 and 3.22 it is not possible for the flow passing through the edge
e5 = (Vt[x, y”1], Vt[x+ 1, y”2]) to be greater than zero if it has one of the following conditions:
• y1 < y”1 and y”2 ≤ y′2: The assumptions y”2 ≤ y′2 and y2 > y′2 result that y”2 < y2. Since
y”2 < y2 and y1 < y”1, by Definition 3.22 e1 and e5 cross which contradicts with the fact
that the pair of crossing edges (e1, e2) are the minimum crossing flow, hence by Definition
3.23 crossing pair (e1, e5) is less than the pair (e1, e2).
• y”1 ≤ y1 and y′2 < y”2: In this case, since y1 < y′1 and y”1 ≤ y1 hold, the inequality y”1 < y′1
also holds. In addition, hence y”1 < y
′
1 and y
′
2 < y”2, by Definition 3.22 e2 and e5 are crossing.
Here, we obtain a contradiction because by Definition 3.23 the pair (e2, e5) is less than the
pair(e1, e2) and it contradict with the fact that (e1, e2) is the minimum crossing flow.
In this function, to resolve this cross the amount of flow crossing through both edges e1 and
e2 decreases by the minimum of them. This amount is added to the flow crossing through edges
e3 = (Vt[x, y1], Vt[x + 1, y
′
2]) and e4 = (Vt[x, y
′
1], Vt[x + 1, y2]). After applying the function the
mentioned cross is resolved hence no flow passes through at least one of the edges forming it, but it
is possible to have new crossing flows since we add flow to at most two edges that there was no flow
crossing through them. We explore the new possible crosses that edges e3 and e4 form, separately.
• e3: If before resolving the mentioned cross, ft(e3) > 0 holds, adding flow to it does not form
a new crossing flow. So we assume that ft(e3) = 0 and explore the possible new crosses
after adding flow to it. Recall that by Definition 3.22 the edge e5 = (Vt[x, y”1], Vt[x+ 1, y”2])
crosses e3 iff (y”1 < y1 and y
′
2 < y”2) or (y1 < y”1 and y”2 < y
′
2), but we have proved that
both of these conditions contradict with the fact that (e1, e2) is the minimum crossing flow.
So increasing the ft(e3) does not form a new cross.
• e4: The same as e3, we assume that the initial flow of this edge is zero. Recall that the
edge e5 = (Vt[x, y”1], Vt[x + 1, y”2]) crosses e4 iff (y”1 < y
′
1 and y2 < y”2) or (y
′
1 < y”1 and
y”2 < y2). Since we have proved that the relations (y1 < y”1 and y”2 ≤ y′2) and (y”1 ≤ y1
and y′2 < y”2) are invalid and y1 < y′1 and y′2 < y2, the relations (y′1 < y”1 and y”2 ≤ y′2) and
(y”1 ≤ y1 and y2 < y”2) are also invalid. So the following condition holds for e5:
(y1 < y”1 < y
′
1 and y2 < y”2) or (y
′
1 < y”1 and y
′
2 < y”2 < y2)
One can easily see that by Definition 3.23 the crossing flow (e4, e5) is greater than the crossing
folw (e1, e2).
Hence after resolving the crossing pair (e1, e2) both the edges e3 and e4 does not form a cross less
than the (e1, e2), the minimum cross gets greater at each call of the function ResolveCross, and
since there are polynomially many number of possible crossing edges, the runtime of the function
ResolveCrosses is polynomial. 
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Theorem 3.29
Statement.
Let f = 〈f1, . . . , fT 〉 be a solution of LP 1 without any crossing flows. There exists a polynomial
time algorithm to find a mixed strategy of the defender that is equivalent to f .
Proof. Let p1, . . . , pT be the top-most flow paths of f1, . . . , fT respectively. By Lemma 3.28, any
two consecutive top-most flow paths pi and pi+1 are compatible. Therefore there exists a valid pure
strategy p of the defender, such that the placement of patrols at time point t in p, is the same as
the equivalent pure snapshot of pt. We use an iterative algorithm to construct the desired mixed
strategy s:
1. Find the top-most flow paths p1, . . . , pT of f1, . . . , fT .
2. Construct the pure strategy p, corresponding to p1, . . . , pT .
3. Add p to s with probability q = min |pi|.
4. For any edge e of any pi, decrease fi(e) to fi(e)− q.
5. If there is any flow left in f1, . . . , fT , repeat all the steps.
Correctness: Note that, initially f1, . . . , fT are flows of size 1, therefore s is indeed a probability
distribution over some pure strategies, and thus is a mixed strategy. In addition, although we
change f1, . . . , fT at each step, but the compatibility argument of top-most flow paths still holds.
Let g = 〈g1, . . . , gT 〉 denote the remaining flows after step 4 of the algorithm. We first prove that
after decreasing the flow of some edges in step 4 the following condition, which is a constraint of
the LP, also holds for g:
Σv∈Vt[k;i:j]g
+
t (v) ≤ Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:j])g+t+1(v′) ∀t, k, i, j : t ∈ [T ], k ∈ [K], 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ nt (11)
We first assume there exist valid values for t, i, j and k such that the following holds:
Σv∈Vt[k;i:j]g
+
t (v) > Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:j])g
+
t+1(v
′) (12)
Then we obtain a contradiction. Let Vt[k, x] and Vt+1[k, y] respectively denote the k-th vertices
of the top-most paths in ft and ft+1. Holding Equation 12 yields both Vt[k, x] /∈ Vt[k; i : j] and
Vt+1[k, y] ∈ feast(Vt[k; i : j]). Also, One can easily see that j < x. Moreover, since Vt+1[k, y] ∈
feast(Vt[k; i : j]), and there exists no flow passing through vertices above Vt+1[k, y] in both gt and
ft,
Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:x])f
+
t+1(v
′) = Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:j])g
+
t+1(v
′) + q (13)
In addition, hence Vt[k, x] /∈ Vt[k; i : j],
Σv∈Vt[k;i:j]g
+
t (v) + q ≤ Σv∈Vt[k;i:x]f+t (v) (14)
So, by (13) and (14):
Σv∈Vt[k;i:j]g
+
t (v) + Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:x])f
+
t+1(v
′) ≤ Σv∈Vt[k;i:x]f+t (v) + Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:j])g+t+1(v′) (15)
Having both (12) and (15) yields the following inequality:
Σv′∈feast(Vt[k;i:x])f
+
t+1(v
′) < Σv∈Vt[k;i:x]f
+
t (v) (16)
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Note that f is a solution of the LP, and this is a contradiction with the line 9 in LP 1. So, equation
11 holds for g.
However, yet g is not a set of canonical flows since for any t ∈ [T ] the amount of flow in gt is
equal to 1− q. To resolve this we multiply the flow in all the edges by 11−q . So, g is a collection of
canonical paths. Note that the top-most paths are unchanged by this multiplication and equation
11 still holds for g. Recall that by Lemma 3.28 the consecutive top most paths in g are compatible,
so the correctness of this algorithm is proved.
Running Time: The algorithm will halt in polynomial rounds since at each round the flow
passing through at least one edge in some flow fi will be decreased to zero and the number of edges
is polynomial. 
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